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Civil Procedure-ATToRNEY's FEES-RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES-The Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980)
The Equal Access to Justice Act' (EAJA), which took effect Oc-
tober 1, 1981, substantially changed existing law.2 Formerly, pri-
vate litigants could recover attorney's fees against the United
States only when specifically authorized by statute.3 Enacted by
Congress to offset this deterrent to challenging unreasonable gov-
ernment actions,4 the EAJA provides for fee awards to parties who
prevail against the government in civil actions and adversarial
adjudications.5
Although the statute retains a general provision barring an
award of attorney's fees and expenses against the federal govern-
ment, sections 2412(b) and 2412(d) provide sweeping exceptions.
Under section 2412(b), the United States is now liable to a prevail-
ing adversary "to the same extent that any other party would be
liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute
which specifically provides for such an award" except where an
award is prohibited by statute.'
Section 2412(d) is the EAJA's most significant provision. Under
its terms, the court shall award attorney's fees and expenses to the
prevailing party in any civil action (except tort actions) unless the
government can show its position to have been substantially justi-
fied or unless special cirdumstances make such an award unjust.7
The effect of this subsection is to provide a means of shifting fees
to the government in most situations where an award is not au-
thorized under common law principles or a specific statute.
The purpose of this note is to identify the common issues which
1. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified
at 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 500,504, amending 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2401, 2412, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West
Supp. 1981)) [hereinafter cited as EAJA].
2. This note addresses only those portions of the EAJA amending 28 U.S.C. § 2412. In
addition the Act repealed Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(f), thus subjecting the government to that rule's
sanctions for abuse of discovery. EAJA § 205(a), 94 Stat. 2330.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 4984 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; H. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5003, 5010 [hereinafter cited as H.
CONF. REP.].
5. 5 U.S.C. § 504 provides for fee awards, but only in adjudications where the United
States is an adversary. At the administrative level, the factor distinguishing whether the
adjudication is adversarial in nature is whether the government agency has taken a position
through counsel. Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b) (West. Supp. 1982).
7. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
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have arisen in the initial decisions construing the EAJA. Where
appropriate, the resolution of these issues is analyzed in light of
the Act's legislative history and the goals it was intended to
achieve. Finally, it is suggested that the Act effectively accom-
plishes its intended purposes.
I. ISSUES COMMON TO SECTIONS 2412(b) AND 2412(d)
The EAJA applies to those actions pending on or commenced as
of October 1, 1981.8 Because the Act does not provide a definition
of "pending," some issues have arisen concerning the term's mean-
ing and application. Although these issues will eventually disap-
pear, they deserve some treatment due to the many cases filed
before that date which are still awaiting final resolution.
Most courts considering the issue have decided that an action
was pending for EAJA purposes as long as the right to appeal had
not expired or been exhausted.9 Some courts have so held even
where the only matter involved on appeal was whether a fee award
should be granted. In Knights of the KKK v. East Baton Rouge
Parish School Board,'0 the Klan had requested and been denied a
fee award against the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare." The EAJA went into effect while the Klan's appeal was
pending before the Supreme Court, which then remanded the ac-
tion for "reconsideration in light *of that Act."' 2 The Fifth Circuit
decided the Act's provisions applied:
The fact that a motion for attorneys' fees is the only matter
pending before a court does not mean that court lacks jurisdiction
or that the case is not 'pending.'. . . Because the Klan's right to
appeal had not expired or been exhausted, its action was 'pend-
ing' on the effective date for the purposes of applying the
[EAJA]."-
The Seventh Circuit, however, has taken the opposite stance. In
Commissioners of Highways of Towns of Annawan v. United
8. EAJA § 208, 94 Stat. 2330.
9. E.g., Knights of the KKK v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64, 67
(5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Citizens State Bank, 668 F.2d 444, 446 (8th Cir. 1982);
Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
10. 679 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1982).
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. (footnote omitted).
13. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
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States,1 4 the court refused to apply the EAJA where the Commis-
sioners' appeal from a denial of attorney's fees was pending on the
Act's effective date.1 5 The decision was based on an observation
that the Act represents a waiver of sovereign immunity which must
be strictly construed rather than "extended by implication. 6
In those actions found to be "pending" on the Act's effective
date where a fee award has been allowed, the courts have uni-
formly included fees and expenses incurred prior to that date.1 7
These decisions have been primarily based on a concern that "con-
struing the Act to bifurcate cases on October 1, 1981 would eschew
the purpose of the Act to provide financial assistance to those liti-
gants who would not ordinarily be able to contest unreasonable
government action."18 In addition, this intention was implied by
Congress when the Act was made applicable to cases pending on
its effective date.19
Another threshold requirement for recovery under each of the
Act's operative subsections is that the party seeking the fee award
must be a "prevailing party."20 In United States v. Citizens State
Bank,2" the Eighth Circuit decided this requirement may be met
by something less than a total victory after a full trial on the mer-
its: "A party may be deemed prevailing if he or she obtains a
favorable settlement of the case, . . . if the plaintiff has sought a
voluntary dismissal of a groundless complaint, .. or even if he or
she does not ultimately prevail on all issues. '22
To what extent a failure to prevail on all issues affects the right
to recovery is unclear. In United States v. Miscellaneous Porno-
graphic Magazines,23 the plaintiff, YourStyle Publishers, sought
recovery of attorney's fees incurred in litigation involving allegedly
14. 684 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1982).
15. Id. at 444. The commissioners had sought attorneys' fees in the district court under
42 U.S.C. § 4654(a)(2), which allows such an award in condemnation proceedings abandoned
by the United States. Id. at 445.
16. Id. at 444.
17. E.g., Shumate v. Harris, 544 F. Supp. 779, 783 (W.D.N.C. 1982); Nunes-Correia v.
Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812, 816 (D.D.C. 1982); United States v. Pomp, 538 F. Supp. 513, 515
(M.D. Fla. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Idaho 1982); Photo
Data, Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 351 (D.D.C. 1982).
18. Photo Data, 533 F. Supp. at 351.
19. Id.
20. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2412(b), 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
21. 668 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1982).
22. Id. at 447 (citations omitted). The court also observed that a party may be deemed
prevailing prior to the losing party having exhausted its right to appeal in certain situations.
Id.
23. 541 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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pornographic magazines seized by federal authorities.24 YourStyle
had urged six arguments in the seizure litigation. Acceptance of
any of the six by the court would have resulted in the release of
the seized materials.2 5 Finding one of these arguments valid, the
court released the magazines.2 Without deciding whether a fee
award was appropriate, the court deemed the publishing company
"a prevailing party as to a very small part of the services provided
by its counsel. '2 7 The company was ordered to amend its claim to
include only those fees and expenses incurred in preparing the
winning argument.2
8
This decision may have been intended to discourage attempts to
increase the amount of recovery by preparation and assertion of
groundless claims in addition to those reasonably expected to pre-
vail. If strictly applied, however, such an approach would have a
"chilling effect" on the best efforts of counsel in contesting unrea-
sonable government actions, thus undercutting the congressional
intention in enacting the EAJA.2 9 Attorneys for parties in litigation
against the government should not be deterred from urging every
reasonable argument in behalf of their clients. Toward this end, a
winning party who does not prevail on all asserted arguments
should simply be considered a "prevailing party" entitled to fur-
ther determination of what recovery, if any, is appropriate under
the Act's operative subsections. Both sections 2412(b) and 2412(d)
provide sufficient discretionary latitude for a court to reduce an
award to allow for perceived abuse."0
24. Id. at 123.
25. Id. at 126.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 126. Upon further consideration, the court concluded no fee award was appro-
priate under the EAJA. Id.
29. The stated purpose of the EAJA is to encourage the challenging of unreasonable
government actions by reducing the disparity of financial resources between private parties
and the federal government. See H.R. REP. supra note 4 at 4988, which states that:
The Government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce com-
pliance with its position. Where compliance is coerced, precedent may be estab-
lished on the basis of an uncontested order rather than the thoughtful presenta-
tion and consideration of opposing views. In fact, there is evidence that small
businesses are the target of agency action precisely because they do not have the
resources to fully litigate the issue. This kind of truncated justice undermines the
integrity of the decision making process.
30. Section 2412(b) provides that a court may award fees and expenses under its provi-
sion. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). While its language requires a fee award unless the government
meets its burden, section 2412(d) allows the court, in its discretion, to reduce or deny an
award to the extent the prevailing party "engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasona-
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Once a party has met these threshold requirements for applica-
tion of the EAJA, a determination of whether fee shifting is appro-
priate is made under either section 2412(b) or 2412(d), or both. As
will be seen, these two subsections differ substantially."1 Therefore,
they will be discussed separately.
II. RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 2412(b)
Section 2412(b) of the EAJA provides that:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reason-
able fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which
may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing
party in any civil action brought by or against the United States
or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his
or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such
action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and ex-
penses to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
specifically provides for such an award. 3
A. Common Law
The general rule followed in the federal courts (the "American
Rule") is that litigants must pay their own attorney's fees, regard-
less of the outcome of the case.33 There are two traditional excep-
tions to this rule. Fees are recoverable under the "bad faith" and
the "common fund/common benefit" doctrines in proper situa-
tions."s The award of attorney's fees under these doctrines is "an
exercise of the general equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3s5
The bad faith exception applies when a party's opponent has ac-
ted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
bly protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(C)
(West Supp. 1982).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
32. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b) (West Supp. 1982).
33. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975); Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). In contrast, English
courts have traditionally assessed attorneys' fees against the losing litigant in most cases.
See generally Goodhart, Costs 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
34. See generally Alyeska, supra note 33. In Alyeska, the Court discontinued the use in
federal courts of another American Rule exception, the "private attorney general" doctrine,
which provided for fee awards where a party acted to vindicate a public policy which the
legislature had deemed important. 421 U.S. at 270 n.46.
35. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 62 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D.
Del. 1974) (footnote omitted).
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sons."' 6 The requisite bad faith may be found either in actions
leading to a lawsuit or in the conduct of the litigation itself 3 7 This
exception has limited application, however, and is found only in
extreme cases. 8
A finding of bad faith in actions leading up to litigation usually
involves a situation where one party has unjustifiably refused to
recognize the legal rights of another, thereby forcing that party to
resort to litigation to enforce those rights.39 Thus, bad faith has
been found when a company unjustifiably refused to compensate
its employees when it had a clear duty to do SO,40 a school board
continued to hinder desegregation efforts long after the Supreme
Court mandated desegregated education 1 and a labor union which
had a duty to protect its members' rights was found guilty of racial
discrimination.2
Bad faith in the conduct of litigation may be found on the part
of either party. Common examples include situations where a
plaintiff has instituted a groundless claim against the defendant
who is then forced to defend against the claim,' 3 a defendant as-
serts a baseless defense forcing the plaintiff into an unnecessary
trial to prove the defendant's liability4 ' or either party engages in
conduct such as refusing to comply with court orders or introduc-
ing groundless, oppressive motions or petitions which prolong the
litigation.'8
Although the EAJA facially subjects the United States to com-
mon law principles, a bad faith finding may be more difficult to
obtain against the government than against private parties. At
least one court has held that federal officials are entitled to a pre-
sumption of "good faith dealing." Pointing to its own pre-EAJA
precedent, the court in Haney v. United States'6 declared that:
[a]ny analysis of a question of Governmental bad faith must be-
36. F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
37. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
38. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 54.77(2)(2d ed. 1982).
39. Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 319,
325 (1977).
40. Lewis v. Texaco, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
41. Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
42. Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
43. Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 28 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1928).
44. Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
45. Local No. 149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212, 214-15 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962).
46. 676 F.2d 584 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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gin with the presumption that public officials act 'conscientiously
in the discharge of their duties'. . . . A finding of bad faith re-
quires well-nigh irrefragable proof in order for the court to aban-
don the presumption of good faith dealing. . . . The necessary
and almost irrefutable proof has been equated with evidence of a
'specific intent to injure the plaintiff.'47
Thus, plaintiffs in an action against the United States may face an
almost insurmountable obstacle when attempting to prove govern-
mental bad faith in conduct leading up to the litigation.
The Haney approach appears to be in conflict with the language
of section 2412(b) making the government liable for fees and ex-
penses "to the same extent that any other party would be liable
under common law." Although the approach has apparently not
been expressly adopted by other courts, their decisions do indicate
a reluctance to find bad faith on the part of the government.48
The other major exception to the American rule, the common
fund/common benefit doctrine, allows fee shifting where a liti-
gant's actions have conferred a substantial benefit upon an ascer-
tainable class.4 This may include two situations. First, the party
may create or preserve a fund of money or assets for the benefit of
a class of which he or she is a member (common fund). Secondly,
the party may preserve substantial non-pecuniary benefits for the
class (common benefit).50
A proper discussion of this complex exception is beyond the
scope of this comment.61 However, a few general observations
should be made. In the common fund situation, the fee award to
the litigating party is made from the fund created or preserved by
47. Id. at 586 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
48. No EAJA decisions have been found allowing a fee award against the United States
under the bad faith exception. Cases denying recovery against the government under bad
faith principles include Commissioners of Highways v. United States, 684 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.
1982), Haney v. United States, 676 F.2d 584 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Donovan v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d
1196 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 542 F. Supp. 482 (D. Minn.
1982); Matthews v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Ga. 1982). It should be noted that
the Federal Tort Claims Act does not allow recovery against the United States for inten-
tional torts. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Therefore, a litigant who has successfully brought a negli-
gence action against the government may be estopped from asserting that the government's
actions were taken in bad faith, because to prevail on this issue would be tantamount to
establishng an intentional tort in most cases.
49. Dods & Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. REv. 48, 59 (1981).
50. Id.
51. For a general discussion of common fund/common benefit application, see Comment,
Attorney Fees: Slipping From The American Rule Strait Jacket, 40 MoNT. L. REV. 308,
309-12 (1979).
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the party's action.62 In this sense, the award is not made against
the losing party. Rather the award is recovered from the non-liti-
gating class members for their share of the expense incurred.
In the common benefit situation, the award is also a shifting of
the financial burden of litigation to those benefited by the action.
In some situations, such as when the benefited class consists of the
general public, the award could be made against the government
within the rationale underlying this type of fee-shifting.53
B. Statutory Authorization
Section 2412(b) also allows recovery of fees against the United
States under the terms of statutes which specifically provide for
such an award. Such statutory exceptions to the American rule
have been enacted by Congress to promote desired policies in
many areas." Because these statutes set forth their own require-
ments for fee recovery, they will not be discussed in this comment.
It should be noted, however, that courts interpreting the EAJA
have generally refused to allow fee awards under statutes which do
not specifically authorize recovery against the United States, 5 al-
though the existence of such statutes does not preclude an award
under common law principles or under section 2412(d).5 e
III. RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 2412(d)
Even if recovery is unavailable under section 2412(b), a prevail-
ing party may still recover attorney's fees against the United
States under the EAJA:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court
shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
52. Id. at 309.
53. However, the use of the doctrine in this manner may be precluded. See Alyeska, 421
U.S. at 264 n.39, where the Court stated that the common fund/common benefit exception
"ill suits litigation in which the purported benefits accrue to the general public....
[Slophisticated economic analysis would be required to gauge the extent to which the gen-
eral public, the supposed beneficiary, as distinguished from selected elements of it, would
bear the costs."
54. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Voting Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Pomp, 538 F. Supp. 513, 514 (M.D. Fla. 1982). But see Matthews v. United States, 526 F.
Supp. 993, 1008 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
56. Ocasio v. Schweiker, 540 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v.
Pomp, 538 F. Supp. at 514.
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fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursu-
ant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action
(other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or against the
United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, un-
less the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.57
A. Limitations on Recovery
Section 2412(d) includes several limitations not applicable to
section 2412(b). Initially, even though prevailing, 8 a litigant must
further qualify under the subsection's definition of "party" to in-
voke its operative provision. To qualify as a party, an individual's
net worth must not exceed $1,000,000 at the time the action is
filed.59 A sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association,
or organization may qualify as a party if (1) its net worth does not
exceed $5,000,000,60 or (2) it employs no more than 500 persons."'
The subsection also limits the rate of recovery. "Reasonable" at-
torney and expert witness fees are based on the prevailing market
rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished.6 2 In addi-
tion, an upper limit of $75 per hour is set for attorney's fees unless
an increase in the cost of living or other special factor justifies a
higher fee." Expert witness compensation is further limited to the
highest rate paid such experts by the United States.6 4
B. The Substantial Justification Standard
To recover under section 2412(d), a prevailing party must first
allege that the position of the United States was not substantially
justified.6 5 The government then has the burden of demonstrating
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1982).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 20-30.
59. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1982).
60. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(ii).
61. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(iii).
62. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
63. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
64. Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(i).
65. Id. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The term "substantially justified" was adopted from rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for sanctions against parties who abuse
the discovery process. See Notes, Will the Sun Rise Again for the Equal Access to Justice
Act? 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265, 290-95 (1982). To this point, however, courts have inter-
preted section 2412(d) without looking to the common law application of the rule 37 term
for guidance.
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substantial justification for its position.6 The standard is de-
scribed as "essentially one of reasonableness" of the government's
actions.6 7 Where the government demonstrates that its case had a
reasonable basis "both in law and in fact," no award will be
granted. This new standard was intended to serve as a "middle
ground" betweenan automatic fee award to a prevailing party and
permitting a fee award only where the government's position was
arbitrary or frivolous.6
Some courts have held that the substantial justification standard
focuses only on the government's position in the litigation.70
Others, however, have scrutinized the government's actions leading
up to the lawsuit as well. Thus, in Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer,71
the government's position was not substantially justified where the
plaintiff's low bid on a government printing contract had been re-
jected upon a finding that the plaintiff was irresponsible. This
finding had been the result of erroneously coded computer tapes.72
After prevailing in a declaratory action brought to obtain further
consideration in the contract award process, the plaintiff sought
attorney's fees.73 The court granted the award because plaintiff's
bid had been rejected "with no more than a terse three-sentence
letter," observing that "[iln order to ensure evenhandedness the
Court must scrutinize not only the government's theory in defend-
ing the legal issues raised but also the occurrences that impelled
plaintiff to bring this action. '74
One significant factor in a substantial justification analysis is the
manner in which the underlying action has been resolved. In
Berman v. Schweiker76 Berman successfully sought reversal of a
Social Security Administration decision denying his request for re-
66. H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4989.
67. Id. Some courts have interpreted this language to mean the standard is slightly
above one based on reasonableness, e.g., Nunes-Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812, 817
(D.D.C. 1982); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 424 (D. Idaho 1982).
68. H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4989.
69. Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1982), citing H.R. REP.,
supra note 4, at 4993.
70. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D. Utah
1982); Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp. 225, 228 (D. Md.
1981).
71. 533 F. Supp. 348 (D.D.C. 1982).
72. Id. at 349.
73. Id. at 349-50.
74. Id. at 352 (footnote omitted.)
75. 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. II. 1982).
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vision of his earnings record.7' Emphasizing the fact that Berman
had prevailed on summary judgment, the court relied on the legis-
lative history of section 2412(d) to find the government's position
had not been substantially justified:
Certain types of case dispositions may indicate that the Gov-
ernment action was not substantially justified. A court should
look closely at cases, for example where there has been a judg-
ment on the pleadings or where there is a directed verdict or
where a prior suit on the same claim had been dismissed. Such
cases clearly raise the possibility that the government was unrea-
sonable in pursuing the litigation."
The fact that the government loses the underlying action does
not, however, raise a presumption that its position was not sub-
stantially justified.7 8 In addition, the government need not show
that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability
of prevailing.79 In Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB,80 the NLRB
had certified the employees of several of the bank's branches as
appropriate bargaining units and had ordered the bank to begin
negotiations with those units."s The Sixth Circuit refused to en-
force the order; its own precedent clearly established that the
NLRB's actions constituted an abuse of its discretion.82 Neverthe-
less, the court found the government's position had been substan-
tially justified as "a reasonable attempt to reopen a closed
question."83
The Wyandotte decision has the effect of further muddling an
already unclear standard. It signals that a government agency's po-
sition, despite being contrary to precedent, may be considered sub-
stantially justified if the agency argues that such precedent should
be changed. Such a position does not seem justifiable in law.
While, as indicated, the government need not establish that its de-
76. Id. at 1150. The government had argued that Berman should be classified in an em-
ployee category which had not existed during the time of his employment. Id. at 1154.
77. Id. at 1154, quoting H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4989-90.
78. H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4990.
79. Id.
80. 682 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1982).
81. Id. at 119.
82. Id. at 119-20.
83. Id. at 120. It is considered ethically permissible for an attorney to advance "a claim
or defense that is unwarranted under existing law" when that claim or defense is supporta-
ble "by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."
MODEL CODE op PROFESSIONAL RasPoNsmumrry DR 7-102(A)(2)(1982).
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cision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevail-
ing, the standard does require some reasonable probability to have
existed. Assuming the Sixth Circuit did not wish to deter the
NLRB from advancing similar claims, the court could have accom-
plished the same result through application of the "special circum-
stances" language in section 2412(d). Congress intended this
"safety valve" provision be used for the purpose. 4
Some substantial justification analyses have focused on the fac-
tual, rather than legal, bases of the government's positions. In
these cases, a fairly clear pattern has emerged. Where the govern-
ment's position is supported by some evidence or information, sub-
stantial justification will be found. Such was the case in United
States v. Citizens State Bank, 5 where the plaintiff taxpayer had
prevailed in an action to narrow the scope of an Internal Revenue
Service summons.86 The IRS had received information that the
taxpayer had not filed an income tax return for several years while
receiving income.87 The Eighth Circuit found this information suf-
ficient to justify the attempt to enforce the summons, which had
required production of bank records.8 8
The evidence upon which the government's action is based need
not be substantial. In Bennett v. Schweiker,89 Bennett brought an
action for review of a final decision by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services denying her claim for retirement insurance bene-
fits.90 The court found the Secretary's position had not been sup-
ported by substantial evidence and reversed his decision. 1 The
court denied Bennett's motion for fees and expenses, concluding
that "a finding that the Secretary's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence does not require a concurrent finding by this
court that the Secretary's decision was not substantially
justified. '92
84. See H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4990, where the report states: "the Government
should not be held liable where 'special circumstances would make the award unjust.' This
'safety valve' helps to insure that the Government is not deterred from advancing in good
faith the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law that often underlie
vigorous enforcement efforts."
85. 668 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1982).
86. Id. at 447.
87. Id. at 448.
88. The IRS sought production of bank records of accounts in plaintiff's name and in the
name of an organization over which he had signature authority. Id. at 445.
89. 543 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1982).
90. Id. at 897.
91. Id.: at 898.
92. Id. (quoting Wolverton, 533 F. Supp. at 425). But see Operating Engineers, 541 F.
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In contrast, a government position will not be found to be sub-
stantially justified when there is no evidence to support that posi-
tion. An example is Wolverton v. Schweiker," where plaintiff
brought an action for review of a Secretary of Health and Human
Services decision denying his claim for disability insurance bene-
fits. 94 As did the plaintiff in Bennett, Wolverton prevailed.95 In
Wolverton, however, the Secretary could point to no evidence in
support of his decision and a fee award was granted.9
While Citizen's State Bank, Bennett, and Wolverton provide a
consistent pattern, Bennett appears inconsistent with Congress' in-
tent in enacting section 2412(d). As the legislative history of the
subsection indicates, the standard and burden of proof adopted
were intended "to caution agencies to carefully evaluate their cases
and not to pursue those which are weak or tenuous. '97 In situa-
tions such as Bennett, where the Secretary had not only based his
decision on insubstantial evidence, but had also ignored evidence
presented by the claimant,98 a finding of substantial justification
subverts this congressional intent.
From these and other cases9 9 applying the substantial justifica-
tion standard, some general conclusions may be drawn. First, al-
though the language of section 2412(d) has caused some commen-
tators to label it a "mandatory" fee award, in practice the standard
allows much more discretion than the term implies. Secondly, as is
the case with any standard involving a "reasonableness" determi-
nation, its application requires case by case analysis. Finally, be-
cause the standard is new, a comprehensive body of precedent has
not yet developed. The courts, therefore, will continue to look to
the well-developed legislative history of the Act for guidance. The
practitioner seeking a fee award under section 2412(d) would be
Supp. at 495 ("It is difficult for this court to perceive how action unsupported by 'substan-
tial' evidence could be 'substantially' justified.").
93. 533 F. Supp. 420.
94. Id. at 422.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 425-26.
97. H.R. REP., supra note 4, at 4993.
98. 543 F. Supp. at 898.
99. Other cases finding the government's position substantially justified include Dono-
van v. Dillingham, 668 F.2d 1196 (11th Cir. 1982); Kennedy v. United States, 542 F. Supp.
1046 (D.N.H. 1982); Matthews v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Ga. 1981). Those
decisions not finding substantial justification include Shumante v. Harris, 544 F. Supp. 779
(W.D.N.C. 1982); Nunes-Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp. 812 (D.D.C. 1982); Hoang'Ha v.
Schweiker, 541 F. Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1982); United States v. Pomp, 538 F. Supp. 513
(M.D. Fla. 1982).
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well advised to review this history thoroughly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The EAJA is a carefully designed congressional effort to provide
individuals and small businesses with greater incentive to contest
unreasonable actions by government agencies and officials. On bal-
ance, the Act appears to achieve its intended purpose. Some of the
initial decisions applying section 2412(d), however, indicate judi-
cial reluctance to award fees and expenses against the government
as long as there is any basis for the government's position. If the
intended benefits of the EAJA are to be realized, the government
must be discouraged from maintaining those positions which are
weak or tenuous.
Section 2412(d) is scheduled for repeal through sunset in 1984.
By that time, a substantial body of case law applying the subsec-
tion will have developed. It is hoped that application will be con-
sistent with the Act's goals and that Congress will make the sub-
section's provisions permanent. The substantial justification
standard, if applied as Congress intended, has the potential to pro-
vide greater scrutiny of government activity without significantly
hindering valid and aggressive regulatory efforts, thus providing a
clear incentive for federal agencies and officials to expend their re-
sources more efficiently.
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